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As the author of a book entitled Žižek and Theology, I have a special stake in this book.1 It is 
somewhat ironic, then, that I found it so difficult to get through. I‘m glad I did, because I found 
Žižek‘s final response very valuable, particularly its concluding section – yet overall I found The 
Monstrosity of Christ to be a significant disappointment. I‘ll begin by discussing why I found the 
first two pieces by Žižek and Milbank, respectively, to be a chore. I will then spend 
proportionately more time on Žižek‘s response, indicating why I found it so compelling. Finally, 
I will conclude with some remarks about the format of the volume as a whole. 
 
1. 
 
Žižek‘s opening piece, ―The Fear of Four Words,‖ which he characterizes as ―a modest plea 
for the Hegelian reading of Christianity,‖ held few surprises for me. In it, he puts forward the 
same basic reading of Christianity that I point out in my book: a reading in which God the Father 
empties himself irreversibly into the Son, whose death on the cross opens up the way for a new 
social bond called the Holy Spirit. So far, I was of course relieved that Žižek had not radically 
repudiated his position. Yet the political aspects of this theology, which I found most interesting, 
are muted – most notably in his lack of engagement with Judaism, which was one of the truly 
creative aspects of his reading of Paul in particular
2
 – and he focuses instead on questions of the 
doctrine of God, proceeding by way of various discussions of the Christian tradition (the doctrine 
of the Trinity, the theology of Meister Eckhart). While his general point that orthodoxy has 
tended to attempt to ―contain‖ the radical consequences of the incarnation is well taken, I found 
his readings of the tradition to be unsatisfying and overlong.  
Even less satisfying was Milbank‘s ―response‖ – which is in reality more like a summary of 
Milbank‘s own position, developed in an often very loose dialogue with the broad outlines of 
what he claims to be Žižek‘s position. Most telling in this regard is the almost total absence of 
direct quotations of Žižek‘s own words. Though footnotes are abundant, the ones that 
purportedly support his reading of Žižek often refer to huge chunks of Žižek, Lacan, or Hegel in 
one broad sweep, imparting a vague flavor to his arguments that is matched in the main text by 
his breezy name-dropping (Žižek is here quite Schellingian, there almost Kierkegaardian, etc. – 
nowhere is it clarified what these various points of proximity concretely mean).  
Quite often, Milbank completely misconstrues Žižek‘s position, assimilating it to a bizarre 
reading of the sexual deadlocks of psychoanalysis that serves as little more than a set-up to prove 
that Radical Orthodox views on sexuality are somehow superior. One aspect of the Radical 
Orthodoxy literature that initially attracted me was their engagement with the latest in 
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continental philosophy, but eventually it became clear that, as is the case here, the philosopher is 
little more than a ―nihilist‖ punching bag to be dismissed in favor of Augustine or Aquinas – or 
in this case, in favor of idiosyncratic readings of Kierkegaard and Eckhart, opportunistically 
chosen because Žižek refers to them. One‘s reward for getting through this essentially useless 
misrepresentation of Žižek‘s views is a belabored, seemingly endless discussion of the 
ontological implications of driving on a misty day. If for Žižek the universe is inherently 
incomplete, apparently for Milbank reality is intrinsically vague.  
Neither of these pieces is satisfying as an ―opening salvo.‖ Each is a virtual book in itself, and 
both get bogged down in secondary matters (most notably the proper reading of Eckhart), such 
that their main point is obscured. I came away from the two pieces exhausted and frustrated, with 
no sense of the contours of the supposed ―debate‖ between the two. So when I came to Žižek‘s 
final response, I was prepared for the worst—but I was pleasantly surprised, to the point that the 
final response essentially redeemed the volume for me.  
 
2. 
 
In light of Milbank‘s misrepresentation, Žižek‘s response is arguably the only authentic 
response in this volume. As readers of his previous responses to critics might expect, he comes 
out swinging. Quoting Milbank repeatedly and at length, he claims that Milbank consistently 
misrepresents Žižek‘s own position and harshly critiques Milbank, at one point going so far as to 
claim that Milbank has ―a soft-Fascist vision‖ (250). To my mind, this aspect of the response is 
sufficient justification for publishing the volume, as it shatters the illusion, held by many of those 
sympathetic with Radical Orthodoxy, that Žižek is a natural ally to orthodox theology.  
More important, though, is that this response is the only thing of Žižek‘s I‘ve read since 
finishing Žižek and Theology that feels genuinely new. I am thinking particularly of the 
conclusion, where he attempts to answer the question of what his ethical approach would look 
like in practice (297–303). He does this through a discussion of Agota Kristof‘s novel The 
Notebook, which for him is ―the best literary expression‖ of an ethical stance that goes beyond 
the sentimentality of moralism and instead installs ―a cold, cruel distance toward what one is 
doing‖ (301). The novel follows two twin brothers who are ―utterly immoral – they lie, 
blackmail, kill – yet they stand for authentic ethical naivety at its purest.‖ Žižek gives two 
examples. In one, they meet a starving man who asks for help and get him everything he asks 
for, while claiming that they helped him solely because he needed help, not out of any desire to 
be kind. In another, they urinate on a German officer with whom they find themselves sharing a 
bed, at his request. Žižek remarks, ―If ever there was a Christian ethical stance, this is it: no 
matter how weird their neighbor‘s demands, the twins naively try to meet them.‖ 
Yet Žižek then takes things in a direction that some will likely be uncomfortable with: not 
only do the boys naively try to help others, they also punish people who maliciously refuse 
others help. In one example from the novel, a woman not only refuses to give bread to a starving 
crowd of Jews but actually eats the bread in front of them, leading the twins to put ammunition 
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in her oven; in another, they blackmail a priest who has sexually molested a little girl, so that 
they can give the money to the girl‘s family. Žižek also provides his own hypothetical example: 
 
Along these lines, it is easy for me to imagine a situation in which I would be ready, 
without any moral qualms, to murder someone in cold blood, even if I knew that this 
person had not killed anyone directly. In reading reports about torture in Latin 
American military regimes, I found particularly repulsive the (regular) figure of a 
doctor who helped the actual torturers conduct their business in the most efficient way: 
he examined the victim and monitored the process, letting the torturers know how much 
the victim would be able to endure, what kind of torture would inflict the most 
unbearable pain, etc. I must admit that if I were to encounter such a person, knowing 
that there was little chance of bringing him to legal justice, and be given the opportunity 
to murder him discreetly, I would simply do it, without a vestige of remorse about 
―taking the law into my own hands.‖ (302) 
  
This is a bold statement, to be sure, but one that I think many would sympathize with on some 
level. After going through some additional examples, including an assisted suicide, Žižek 
summarizes the ethical core that he takes away from Kristof‘s novel as follows: 
 
This is where I stand – how I would love to be: an ethical monster without empathy, 
doing what is to be done in a weird coincidence of blind spontaneity and reflexive 
distance, helping others while avoiding their disgusting proximity. With more people 
like this, the world would be a pleasant place in which sentimentality would be replaced 
by a cold and cruel passion. (303) 
 
When I first read this passage, I had the strange sense of being surprised at the same time that 
I felt it couldn‘t be any other way. His description of these sociopathic twins really does capture 
the core of his weirdly amoral ethics, which has always been at the core of Žižek‘s appeal for me 
– more than his ontology, his use of theology, or his explanations of some of the most difficult 
figures in the history of philosophy, I was drawn to his work by the sense that he offered a real 
alternative to the abstract moralism of the Christianity I knew from childhood and to the cloying 
sentimentalism of the liberals who get such deep satisfaction from nursing their correct opinions. 
I claim several times in my book that most often the aspect of a philosopher‘s thought that is 
most helpful for theologians can be found when religion isn‘t the primarily focus, and for me, 
Žižek is no exception. His ethics provided me with a way to talk about what I had always 
detected at the core of the gospel: a radical amorality, no less joyous for its rigor.  
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3. 
 
It seems to me that Žižek‘s conclusion accomplishes more in seven pages than either author 
had done in the hundreds of pages preceding it. Though I have often been critical of Žižek‘s 
generous use of cut and paste, I hope that the passage finds its way into some future book, simply 
because I am skeptical that many readers will have the stamina to reach it in its present context. 
Before concluding with an overall criticism, I should say that I am glad to see this volume appear 
insofar as it breaks with the general pattern where theologians are enthusiastic about discussing 
philosophy but philosophers never deign to talk back. Furthermore, I believe that Žižek and 
Milbank are, at least in theory, two of the best figures one could choose for such an encounter, 
given their extremely high profile in their respective fields.  
Yet on a variety of levels, no debate actually occurs here. For instance, one could justify the 
opening pieces as an initial setting of the terms, to be followed by a more extended debate, but in 
fact only Žižek gets a chance to respond. While I realize it can be difficult to deal with two huge 
egos such as Milbank and Žižek, I wish the editor, Creston Davis – who has worked with the two 
men before and has another edited volume with them forthcoming
3
 – had exercised more 
editorial control in shaping the volume into a genuine dialogue. As it stands, it‘s clear from his 
introduction that he was envisioning a much different work, as his account of the ways Žižek and 
Milbank supersede the modernist presuppositions of the ―New Atheists‖ debate has no clear 
relation to what Žižek and Milbank actually write. Two further responses have appeared in a 
special issue of Political Theology, also edited by Davis
4
, but that resource remains inaccessible 
to those without privileges at an academic library (and to many of those with) – much better to 
have reined in the initial statements, both to leave room for further exchange and to let the stakes 
of the debate stand out more clearly. 
In an ideal world, each would have put forward a twenty-page initial statement. Žižek would 
have argued that Hegel‘s is the most authentic interpretation of Christianity, revealing the radical 
consequences of Christ‘s death on the cross that orthodoxy has consistently sought to cover over 
and, moreover, opening up an entirely new view of reality. Milbank could have then argued that 
Žižek‘s reading is one-sided, leaving out important aspects of experience and reality that 
orthodoxy includes and, moreover, leading to a nihilistic amorality. (In light of Žižek‘s 
conclusion, it would be hard to deny the latter charge, though I would then ask what‘s so self-
evidently wrong about nihilistic amorality.) From there, they could try to substantiate their view 
and disprove each other – debating the significance of the doctrine of the Trinity, sparring over 
whether thinkers such as Meister Eckhart represent a kind of prefiguration of Hegel, discussing 
the ontological consequences of the Incarnation, and pitting paradox and dialectic against one 
another in a much more direct way.  
Readers could have come away from such a volume feeling like they had a good grasp on the 
main points of contention between the latest advocates of orthodoxy and radical theology, 
between traditional theology and the gospel of Christian atheism. And in a sense, readers do 
actually have all the materials I describe in the actual existing book, but they‘re in an almost 
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completely unusable format. Žižek has often said that philosophical dialogues are ultimately just 
competing monologues, but in this case, the greatest sin isn‘t that Žižek and Milbank fail to talk 
to each other – more seriously, they fail to talk to any discernable audience outside those who 
have already very closely followed their work.  
I have chided the editor of the volume for not being more forceful in pushing for the kind of 
authentic debate he seems to have envisioned, a debate that would be able to engage an educated 
public and push them beyond the simplifications of the ―New Atheists.‖ Yet surely the bulk of 
the responsibility lies with the authors themselves, whose initial pieces aren‘t so much ―difficult‖ 
as long-winded and rambling. I‘m not asking anyone to dumb down their ideas or give us a 
pandering popularization of their work – I‘m simply asking for concision and clarity of 
organization. A genuine debate between Žižek and Milbank could have been illuminating. It 
could have set the agenda for a renewed discussion of the relationship between philosophy and 
theology, atheism and Christianity. What we have instead is still a genuine contribution to the 
literature, one that from my perspective is most valuable insofar as it pushes Žižek‘s position 
forward while simultaneously distancing him from Milbank. Yet it‘s difficult not to regard The 
Monstrosity of Christ as a missed opportunity.  
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